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CONTROLLING CORPORATE CRIME THROUGH
REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

By Mary A.

Vogt

Corporate crime,

16),

according to Clinard and Yeager (1980:

"is any act that is committed by

punishable by the state,

under administrative,

corporations which is

regardless of whether it is

civil,

or criminal law".

This form of

crime is a major social problem within our society

1982).

punished

(Kramer,

The purpose of this project is to examine a variety of

proposals to improve the capability of the criminal justice
system to control the problem of corporate crime,
specific recommendations

and to make

for reform.

Corporate crimes cost the society financially and
physically.

Finacially,

corporate criminals

annually in
businesses

the

"duplicity and cunning"

result in a

of

loss of more than $50 billion

profits and revenues to the government and
(McGowan,

1983).

into billions of dollars,

A single corporate crime can run

while the largest robbery in the

United States cost the Lufthansa airport warehouse $5.4 million
(Mokhiber,

1988).

Corporate crime can also cause enormous physical harm.
Thousands of people have been killed or injured by the criminal
acts of corporations.
diseases

and

Many workers have died from occupational

industrial accidents

as

well

as

from the willful

violation of health and safety standards by corporations.

The

general public is also affected by corporate criminality.
Unsafe and defective products have killed and injured thousands

of consumers.

The general public is also harmed by the

pollution that corporations produce.

Because corporate crime is such a major social problem, it
needs to be dealt with in a more effective manner (Clinard and
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Yeager,

1980).

These crimes are often looked at as less serious

by the general public,

and they are also dealt with less

seriously by the criminal justice system.

difficult to successfully detect,

Overall,

prosecute,

a corporation for its illegal activity.

it is very

convict,

Thus,

and punish

many proposals

have been made to reform the criminal justice system in order to
allow the system to do a better job of controlling corporate

crime.

Most of the proposed reforms merely scratch the surface

in their effort to deal with corporate criminality.
reforms

must

take

ideologically,

into

consideration

structurally,

the

other

Effective

factors

involved

and legally before they can be

viable solutions to the problem.

Reform of the criminal justice system is a cumbersome,

but

vital task in the fight to control corporate criminality.

Although a wide variety of proposals have been suggested to
tackle the problem of corporate crime,

no single proposal would

seem to

is

be

effective

on

its

own.

What

needed

to

combat

corporate criminality is a more comprehensive program which
attempts to solve the problem from more than

just one

perspective.

This project will consist of three parts.

The first

section consists of a description and evaluation of various

sanctions to control corporate crime that have been proposed in
recent years.

The second part of the project consisted of

interviews with the U.S.

Attorney and Assistant U.S. Attorney

within the West Michigan district to obtain their reactions to

the various proposals as well as their ideas regarding other
possible methods of reforming the criminal justice system to
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more effectively deal with corporate crime.

Finally, the last

section of the project presents my conclusions and
recommendations

for

reform

based

on

the data

from the

first

two

sections.

REVIEW

OF

F»ROF»OS/\LS

The proposals to be discussed will be listed according to
whether they fall under pre~violation suggestions,
an offense,

prosecution of an offense,

In the pre-violation area,

discovery of

or sentencing.

several suggestions are offered

as solutions to controlling corporate crime.

These include

proposing new laws to specifically apply to corporate criminal
acts,

applying existing criminal law to corporations,

and

implementing programs dealing with corporate ethics.
Proposing new laws to more effectively control corporate
crime is

a suggestion that has received some support

(Braithwaite and Geis,

1982;

Cullen et al.,

1987).

The reason

that the creation of new laws is proposed is because the

existing laws are not effective or are not utilized for dealing
with corporate crime cases.

The basic premise behind this

proposal is that new laws are necessary if we are serious about
using the legal system to control corporate crime (Cullen et
al.,

1987).
Kramer

(1982:

4)

refers to a

1979 bill which was introduced

in the Congress with the intent of placing criminal liability on
corporations and their managers for nondisclosure of hazardous

products.

This is just one small example of proposing a new law
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to control corporate crime.

however,

Braithwaite and Geis (1982: 293)

caution us that "criminal statutes should only be

applied to business activity where conduct was
egregious, and malevolent'".

'clearly willful,

Proposing new laws makes quite a

bit of sense when trying to suppress crime within corporations.

This approach attempts to deal with the most foundational stage
of the criminal justice system,

the creation of laws.

If

controlling the crime of corporations is the desired outcome,
and if the law does not consider a corporation in the same way

it

considers a person who commits a traditional street crime,

criminal prosecution will be at a standstill.

It also seems

logical that with the ability to prosecute a corporation for
criminal wrongdoing goes the chance to demonstrate general
deterrence.

By

corporation,

hopefully,

that

has

been

successfully prosecuting and convicting a
other companies will see the example

set.

Another alternative to deal with corporate criminality is
to apply the existing laws to the behavior engaged in by the
corporation.

This idea entails making existing criminal laws

more applicable to corporate behavior.

Stone (1977:

57)

states

that although the idea is not necessarily the best route to

take,

the most

"economical" idea would be to just slide the

current laws over the corporation's laws to make them more
accessible within

the

criminal

the Indiana state law,
was not considered a

courts.

Prior

1987).

revision

in

a corporation like the Ford Motor Company

"natural person" that could form criminal

intent or be convicted of a crime (Cullen,
Cavender,

to a

Maakestad,

and

This change made the Ford Pinto homicide trial
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possible.

Another proposal to prevent corporate crime is the
development of stronger business ethics.

It is argued that this

is a way to instill the proper moral attitudes in the people who
are entering the corporation.

A survey done in 1986 by the

Center for Business Ethics at Bentley College found that of
those institutions responding,

three-fourths had written codes

of conduct and one-third had formal ethics training programs
(Horton,

1987).

When companies have certain principles and

their employees also share in these ideas,

they financially

out-performed those who did not have those principles
(Horton,1987).

According to Clinard and Yeager (1980),

the individual

corporations are the starting point for strengthening business

ethics.

Thus,

they suggest developing

corporate business codes".

Finally,

"more effective general

the executives of the

corporation must "censure" other executives who have engaged in
misconduct

of

some

kind.

When trying to control corporate crime,

detection of

violations becomes difficult (Braithwaite and Geis,

Unlike traditional crime,

obvious.

1982).

corporate violations are not always as

For instance, when a corporation violates the safety

standards of the work place and employees are exposed to harmful

chemicals, often the adverse effects of the exposure may not
become apparent for years.

Even then,

if symptoms occur, it has

been difficult to positively point a finger at the responsible
party.

Because of the difficulty of discovering criminality

within corporations,

a proposal has been introduced.

It is for
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the law enforcement agencies to adopt a proactive enforcement
stance.

Proactive enforcement is an idea considered by Braithwaite

and Geis (1982:

297) as a way to control corporate crime.

They

feel that although a proactive stance within corporations may
occasionally border on entrapment,

that

"investigators have

little choice but to go out and discover offenses".

They hold

this idea because the factors which are considered when dealing
with traditional crime are very different from corporate crime.
One very important way that the two forms of crime differ is
that street crime is usually dealt with through a reactive

enforcement stance.

Corporate crime,

however,

cannot be

effectively dealt with in this manner (Braithwaite and Geis,

1982).

Law enforcement should be retrained,

reoriented, and

restructured in such a way as to be able to seek out corporate

criminality (Kramer, 1982).

Proactive enforcement attempts to

respond to the difficult detection problems of corporate

criminality.

Trained law enforcement officers would be a great

help in actively seeking out criminality in companies.
The third stage of the criminal justice system in need of

reform to more effectively deal with corporate crime is the

prosecutorial area.

To make the job of prosecuting a suspected

criminal company easier, the prosecutor must first give careful

thought and consideration to the complexity of the law, the
complexity of science, due process rights afforded to the
corporation,

and its liability.

Braithwaite and Geis (1982) argue that the two major

factors that inhibit the effective prosecution of corporate
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criminality are the complexity of the laws and the complexity of
science.

The complexity of the law makes it practically

impossible to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt.
individuals believe that it

Some

is this complexity of the law which

shifts the balance of power more on the side of the huge
corporations which can then use that power to further their
interests (Kramer,

1982).

Scientific complexity also lends a hand in the confusion

and frustration of prosecuting a corporation for criminal
misconduct,

therefore changing the laws for easier conviction in

the criminal courts is yet another proposal for dealing with
corporate crime.

in two main ways.
case to a

Science makes it difficult for the prosecutor

First,

the prosecutor must try to present the

jury of lay persons.

This becomes difficult with the

abundance of scientific evidence that is often necessary to try
to prove a case.

Second,

if it is necessary to rely upon

scientific data to prove the case,

299)

Braithwaite and Geis (1982:

point out that "science deals in probabilities,

certainties" and,

"Logically,

not

proof beyond a reasonable doubt

that a "causes" b is impossible.

It is always possible that

an observed correlation between a and b is explained by an
unknown third variable c".

For this reason, many people have

proposed that proof "on the balance of probabilities" replace
proof beyond a reasonable doubt (Kramer,

1982).

Other changes that are proposed regarding the laws include

the use of strict liability and changes in certain due process

rights as applied to corporations.
provision would be added

The strict liability

into the revised law to make it
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unnecessary for the state to show criminal intent by the
corporation and its officers (Kramer, 1982).
Braithwaite and Geis (1982) propose a more controversial
idea: certain due process rights should be eliminated from the

corporate realm.

They argue that the right to trial by jury for

many corporate crimes should be ended because of the complexity
of scientific evidence involved.

Kramer (1982) points out that

the privilege against self-incrimination has already been denied
to corporations by the United States Supreme Court.

These

proposals would certainly aid the prosecution in their attempt
to adequately and appropriately deal with corporate crime.

The final stage of the criminal justice system, sentencing,
also needs to be reformed to control corporate crime.

There

have been ideas proposed regarding the individual offender as
well as the corporate entity as the offender.

On the individual

level of dealing with culpable people, a fine, incapacitation,
and imprisonment are the three primary methods of sentencing.
Some argue that imposing criminal penalties upon
responsible individuals is one key to controlling corporate

crime.

Coffee (1981) states that the individual, as well as the

corporation, needs to be focused upon when dealing with
corporate crime.

This approach has a couple of problems

according to Kramer (1982).

One is that many corporate

criminals and judges have similar social backgrounds and
attitudes which will sometimes result in a less harsh sanction.

Another problem with focusing upon the individual is that even

if a stiff fine is imposed on the individual, the deterrant
effect is lost because the corporation often reimburses the
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individual directly under certain indemnification provisions of
corporate law.

The fine, therefore, when placed upon the

individual, is often ineffective (Stone, 1977).

Another proposal that is suggested to control corporate
crime is imprisonment of corporate executives.

Imprisonment is

believed to have more of a deterrent effect upon corporate
criminals than offenders of the lower-class (Geis, 1973).
However, very few corporate executives go to prison for their

misconduct (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).

When people were

surveyed by Cullen et al. (1985), almost 70% of the respondents

believed that incapacitation was appropriate for corporate
violent offenses.

This figure however, was 15 to 30 points

lower than "the higher ranked modes of violence" in spite of the
fact that corporate violence kills far more people.
Imprisonment can also serve as a deterrent for individuals

who consider engaging in criminality.

This idea is a very good

one provided that there is an identifiable violator to prosecute
and

convict.

Incapacitation has also been suggested with regards to the

individual corporate criminal.

On the individual level, the

sanction could be disallowing the person from holding any
position which requires decision-making of any importance
(Braithwaite and Geis, 1982).

Directly punishing the responsible individual seems

appropriate when sentencing.

Corporate crime will occur less

frequently perhaps if those who were convicted of a corporate
crime were taken out of their decision-making capacities.

On the organizational level of sentencing, there are many
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more suggestions to reduce the level of corporate criminality.

The most common way for the court system to respond to corporate
convictions is by fining it (Coffee, 1981; Kennedy, 1985).
Often these fines are too small and thus insufficient deterrents
to the corporations.

Many corporations look upon fines as a

small price to pay for their illegal behavior.

Kennedy (1985:

448) suggests that by creating a penalty far greater than the

"theoretically adequate level for deterrance", corporate
criminality would be reduced.

He also believes that this

concept eliminates the profit motive of the corporation.

Kennedy (1985) proposes three alternatives to fining.

One

mechanism recommended is the "equity" fine, which is a penalty
that is levied in stock.

A second alternative to control

corporate crime is to utilize a "pass-through" fine which is a

penalty that is placed upon the shareholder assets.

Finally,

the "superadded liablity" concept alters the limited liability
rules within a criminal context.

The alternative mechanisms to fining suggested by

Kennedy (1985) seem to try to sidestep some of the problems
associated with traditional fines.

He takes into account the

other players within the company and incorporates his ideas
according to the particular player desired.

Incapacitation is another organizational reform suggested
for controlling corporate crime. Braithwaite and Geis (1982:
305) hold that incapacitation "can be a highly successful
strategy in the control of corporate crime".

On the

organization level, the concept of incapacitation has taken many
forms. Capital punishment could be carried out through the
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revocation of the corporation's charter.

Offending companies

could also be nationalized or be placed in the "hands of a

receiver" (Braithwaite and Geis, 1982).

The general idea of

incapacitation is one of the more dramatic alternatives which

"the courts undoubtedly would be loath to adopt" (Braithwaite
and Geis,

1982: 307).

Another less drastic measure in which to incapacitate a
corporation is to limit their charter.

Braithwaite and Geis

(1982) propose this option when the company has "flagrantly
failed to respect the law".

Corporate crime might also be controlled if the corporation

could be made to sell the part of corporation which consistantly
violates the law, making certain that the "new parent" is

"exemplary in compliance" (Braithwaite and Geis, 1982).
Clinard and Yeager (1980) propose federal corporate
chartering of large corporations as opposed to the state

chartering of corporations which exists today.

Under this

procedure, the corporation would have to abide by the federal
rules and regulations that were imposed upon it.

Enforcement

would also be taken into consideration within the provisions

when proposing the federal charter bill.

Clinard and Yeager

(1980: 312) do not claim that this alone would end corporate
crime, but it would definitely increase accountability.
Clinard and Yeager (1980) have also proposed deconcentration
and divestiture.

The purpose of this proposal is to decrease

the range of power and control that a corporation has.

Today,

large corporations are very difficult to effectively monitor for
law violations, by forcing a large corporation to deconcentrate
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itself of certain product lines or subsidiaries, a partial

solution to controlling corporate crime is formed.

After this

has been accomplished, it is much easier to "keep an eye" on the

company.

An example of a deconcentration plan is the bill

introduced into the legislature by Senator Edward Kennedy in

1979.

The anti-conglomerate bill proposed that if a corporation

had assests or sales of more than $2 million, the corporation
would not be allowed to merge (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).
Another alternative sanction that is proposed to more

effectively deal with corporate crime is rehabilitation.

Organizational intervention is one method of the
"rehabilitation" process and is the most significant reform

proposal regarding the sanctioning of corporations in the
criminal justice system (Kramer, 1982).

The rehabilitative

sanction assumes that the crime is embedded within the

corporation's organizational structure (Kramer, 1982).

The

primary goal of rehabilitation, according to Stone (1977: 62),
is to change "an offender's behavior so as to reduce the

probability of future violations by that offender".

Stone

(1977) developed many ways to sanction corporations such as

reforming the board of directors, creating new management roles,
reviewing management plans on a regular basis, and redesigning
the decision process within the organization.

By using these

ideas, future compliance with the law will be encouraged (Stone,
1977).

Sometimes, defective control systems or ineffective

checks and balances can aid in breeding criminality in

corporations (Braithwaite and Geis, 1982).

If corporations can

cope with these internal problems, the corporation would be
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clean

from the

"inside out".

Rehabilitation can best be implemented if corporate

probation becomes a regularly sought option.

The Yale Law

Journal (1979) sees corporate probation as the preferred method
of rehabilitation.

It suggests that the special features

necessary in the restructuring process can be incorporated into
the conditions of corporate probation.

Corporate probation

requires the corporation to follow the terms established by the
court for a specified length of time.

The Yale Law Journal

(1979: 368) states, "Conditions of probation must be reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection

of society".

Probation of corporations can be appropriate in

three situations; cases in which very dangerous or "inherently

wrongful crimes" occur, cases in which "structural crime" has
occurred, and when restitution to the victims is a part of the
outcome decided upon (Yale Law Journal, 1979).

Rehabilitation and corporate probation were most likely

created to perform a corporate "overhaul".

With both of these

programs being as structured as they are, it seems to be fairly
easy to carry out the court-stipulated terms to better the
corporate environment.

John Braithwaite's (1982) enforced self-regulation is

another proposal which fits into the rehabilitation approach.
The self-regulation process begins with the government

compelling companies to create a set of rules that are

applicable to the uniqueness of that particular corporation.
These rules are then subject to the approval of a new regulatory
agency.

The corporation would then establish an internal team

-14-

of inspectors to enforce compliance with the rules.

The

enforcement costs and jobs would be absorbed by the company,
leaving the auditing of this internalized group to the
governmental inspectors.

Any violation of the rules decided

upon would be punishable by law.

Enforced self-regulation is a proposal that, if mixed with

the right amount of governmental regulation, could be quite

effective (Braithwaite, 1982).

This concept also attempts to

address the internal organization and its cooperation with
governmental

bodies.

Community service is another sanction proposed to aid in

the control of corporate crime.

The goal of this sanction is to

restructure the organization thereby reducing corporate crime
(Kramer, 1982).

The legislature would describe in detail the

components of community service as a sanction for corporations,

and from this the judge could view this method as an option in
sentencing corporations engaging in criminality (Kramer, 1982).
Fisse (1981) has noted that although community service has been

used as a condition of probation, it has been unsatisfactory.
He also contends that community service as a "condition of

mitigation of sentence" has been ineffective as well because it

is less severe than the fine.

According to Fisse (1981), a

formal sanction requiring community service should be attached
to laws governing corporate behavior.

As of 1981, community service orders as sanctions against
corporations had not been developed (Fisse, 1981).

This form of

punishment however, is seen as far superior to fines because it

does not reduce criminality to a "price" (Fisse, 1981).

Due to
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the fact that it does not price a crime and to the fact that the
corporation would be of benefit to the society in some way,
community service as a method to control corporate crime is
advocated.

Publicity is increasingly gaining prominence as a sanction
for controlling corporate crime (Clinard and Yeager,

and Braithwaite,

1983).

1980;

Fisse

According to Clinard and Yeager (1980),

mass media publicity about the law violations that a corporation
committed was their greatest fear.

Publicity is of great value

because of "its capacity to expose and thereby police unwanted

behavior"

(Fisse and Braithwaite,

1983).

Use of publicity as a

method of controlling corporate crime is necessary for a few

reasons:

because most corporate crimes cause injury

"surrepitiously", publicity is necessary for informing the
public; the resentment of the community no longer serves as

a

constraint upon corporate wrong-doing because the vastness of
the corporation obscures the blame;

it is believed that

publicity would "catalyze" enforcement action and;

publicity may

offer some new ideas for sanctioning corporations (Fisse and
Braithwaite,

1983).

Publicity takes two forms:

informal and formal (Clinard and

Yeager, 1980; Fisse and Braithwaite, 1983).

Informal publicity

consists of the news stories that are aired mentioning the law

violation (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).

Clinard and Yeager (1980)

point out that as a sanction, informal publicity is not that

hard to bear because often, the news article regarding a
corporate violation-if it is even in the newspaper-is hidden in

the financial section.

Much of the time therefore, the general
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public does not even realize the extent of corporate crime via

the media.

Within the past decade, more adverse publicity has

been forthcoming with the Ford Pinto trial and the Firestone

"500" cases (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).

Formal publicity more often takes the form of a requirement
of the corporation to publish an advertisement which reveals

what it has done and the corrective action being taken.

Formal

publicity has in the past taken three forms:"as a punishment in
criminal proceedings, as a penalty in quasi-criminal or

administrative proceedings, and as a civil remedy" (Fisse and
Braithwaite, 1983).

The use of publicity as punishment in

criminal proceedings has been rare.

As a penalty in

quasi-criminal or administrative proceedings, formal publicity
has been a popular choice of the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency.

Finally, as a civil remedy, formal publicity has been

used often for correction and prevention (Fisse and Braithwaite,
1983).

Fisse and Braithwaite (1983) recommend a couple of

things, that the details of an offense be published as a

court-ordered sanction, and disclosure of the disciplinary
actions and organization reforms taken to deal with the

corporate offender will be available as a part of a pre-sentence
or probation order.

Deterrence was once again key in the development of this
proposal.

Because corporate criminals are more concerned with

"saving face" in front of their families and peers, publicity
would be effective as a deterrent to corporate criminality.
embarrassment of having an act publicized hopefully would
prevent future criminal occurrences.

The
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INTERVIEWS

The interviews were a very interesting aspect of the

project.

Initially, interviews with the Federal Court judges

within the West Michigan district were desired.

This however,

was not possible due to a lack of their permission.
Attorney,

John Smietanka,

The U.S.

allowed an interview to find out what

his reactions were to some of the current proposals.

Some of

the recommendations he suggested are very unique and well
thought-out.

Below is a summary of the major points of the

interview.

In

regards to creating new laws to more effectively control

corporate criminality,

Smietanka clarified that if monetary loss

to the public was involved,

first and foremost.

victim compensation was necessary

He also thought that the law should fulfill

a retributive as well as a deterrent function.

it

In my opinion,

seems that Smietanka focused solely upon the creation of laws

for improved sentencing.

The newly created laws are more

controversial because of what actions are made illegal,
merely

because of the sentence that the violator would receive.

Interestingly,

although applying current criminal laws

would make it easier for charging a corporation,
not

not

see this

idea

as

a

viable

alternative.

He

Smietanka did

held

that

throughout history,

society has moved from convicting on mens

reas and actus reas

(criminal mind and criminal act

respectively) toward absolute liability.
not suitable for corporate crime cases.

Absolute liability is
In this case, the
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proposal of application of criminal laws to corporations was
interpreted too broadly.

Smietanka, at least under an

assumption that all criminal laws would be applied to

corporations, believed that this was a bad idea.

However, it

would be primarily, the homicide statutes that would be made

applicable to corporate entities,

not all laws in general.

When asked if the elimination of juries in corporate crime

cases would be an option to aid the prosecutor in his endeavor
to control corporate crime,

Smietanka once again replied no.

supported his response with two reasons:

He

juries perform a common

sense role that society needs and society has a right and an
obligation to judge what it itself considers to be criminal.
He also responded negatively to the idea of changing the
standard of proof to proof

"on the balance of probabilities".

Smietanka felt that if a case is so complex that it cannot be
dealt with within a criminal court

"beyond a

reasonable doubt",

then it should go to a civil court where the standard of proof
is only a preponderance of the evidence.

The U.S.

Attorney saw the strict liability provision

suggested by some as detrimental in the long run because he
viewed it as eventually ceasing business.

executive had "strict liability"
not

want

to

be

in

If every corporate

hanging over his head,

he may

business.

It is interesting to me that when researching the above

three proposals it would seem probable that prosecuting
attorneys would jump at opportunities to change the current
system in the ways suggested above.

However,

for Smietanka as

well as Murray, those changes were not sought after-in fact,
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they were considered to be quite silly ideas for reforming the
criminal justice system to combat corporate criminality.
In regards to establishing a proactive law-enforcement

team,

Smietanka broke it down into two requirements: training

and sensitivity.

First,

the law enforcement officers need to be

trained in the specialties of corporate criminality.

Unlike

street crime which deals with more immediate threats, corporate
crime often is hidden within accounting logs or quality control
reports.

Without proper training,

law enforcement would be

ineffective.

Second,

sensitivity is necessary to realize that the law

enforcement agencies fight the crime that society is aware of:
street crime.

The public would be upset if "their" law

enforcement officers were sent someplace else to seek out law
violations.

When asked if he thought rehabilitation would be effective

toward reducing corporate crime, he stated that it would be a

partial solution.

What was key, in his eyes, was to place a

greater emphasis upon ethics in the business world.

Society

needs to glorify those in business who make safe products and
share their profits with their employees and charities.

again, Smietanka missed the point.

Here

Ethics may be a part of the

rehabilitation idea, however, "rehabilitation" of corporations

involve restructuring and changing the problems internally to
make compliance with the law more like.

Probation was considered effective if it was too difficult

to make one person or group of people accountable.

Smietanka's suggestions for increasing the accountability
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within a corporation were to make use of the penalties available
to the system ie.

civil suit damages and criminal penalties.

The above idea supported by Smietanka is an important aspect of
accountability,

is.

In

but more should be taken into consideration than

regards to corporate criminality,

the idea of

accountability should be focused upon before criminality occurs.

The main idea behind the effectiveness of making certain people
or groups of people accountable is that their recognition as
people who can be held responsible for their behavior will be

more cautious of the type of acts they engage in.
considered

in

Smietanka's

This was not

interview.

Smietanka viewed imprisonment of individual offenders as a

viable mechanism for deterrence if the sentence was short, e.g.
six months to one year.

Community service was a wonderful idea in his mind,
provided that it was one alternative and a part of an overall

package which included incarceration,

fines and public exposure.

The alternative methods of reducing corporate crime that

Smietanka came up with,
unique.

I felt, were excellent points and very

There were three main points.

First,

people who

manufacture products should be required to use those products.
Second, people who own a factory or manufacturing plant should
be required to live next to their plant (as should the
managers).

This,

he feels,

will reduce the level of air

pollution.

Finally, it is important to change the ethical

standards through education in schools, media, and research.

The interview conducted with Richard Murray, an Assistant

U.S. Attorney, also contained some interesting ideas.

I found
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it interesting that he agreed with Smietanka when it came to

eliminating the jury, changing the standard of proof to on the

balance of probabilities, and applying a strict liability
standard to corporations.

These three responses had similar

explanations behind them as well.

When asked about adoption of a proactive enforcement

stance, Murray disagreed because he viewed that as soliciting
people to be crooked.

I have to admit that this was an aspect

that I had not considered prior to the interviews with the

attorneys.

In certain respects, soliciting violations is an

accurate description of what takes place with proactive law

enforcement, but it is also quite possible to have people

fufilling a law enforcement function without making corporate
executives commit criminal acts.

Murray also differed from the U.S. Attorney in his view of

rehabilitation.

The Assistant U.S. Attorney thought that

creating a monetary incentive to reform was a good idea, but to
leave the reform to the corporation.

Corporate probation, in Murray's opinion, makes a difficult

job even harder.

This is primarily due to the inability to

properly enforce such a sentence.

When asked about imprisonment of individuals, Murray felt

that because the public views the corporate criminals who get
caught "unlucky", deterrence really is not served.

Although

Murray may be correct in assuming that some corporate criminals

end up looking "unlucky", I do not feel that he gives the public
enough credit.

I believe that there is a growing awareness

among the public in regards to corporate crime.

More of the
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general public is learning about corporate crime and know that

those people deserve to be punished in some way.
Community service, if not well taught, is a waste of time

in Murray's opinion.

Murray failed to elaborate any further

regarding this topic.

Increased publicity is believed to be an effective way to
control corporate crime if 30 second clips that state,
crook" are shown on the television.

In my opinion,

"I am a

I think that

this would be a great way to deter corporate executives from
criminality because the fear of being stigmatized would at least

make them think twice before engaging in the act.

Murray believes that corporate fines are hard to adjust

properly as an effective punishment.

I think that Murray is

correct in his position, although if a scale could be produced

to fairly sentence corporations to a fine, this idea might be
more

effective.

Murray had one main objective to fulfill to control

corporate crime, it dealt with definitions.

One problem, he

stated, about trying to more effectively handle corporate crime

is that society does not always agree on what corporate crime

is.

Also, a definition of "criminal conduct" is necessary

before controlling it can be successful.

FEEOOMMEMPATIOMS A N D C O N C L U S I O N S

From the vast amount of material I have read, as well as
the people I have talked with, I have made several conclusions.

I believe that what is needed is a combined plan to effectively
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combat corporate crime because there is not one proposal that I
have researched that when considered alone would adequately
fulfill

this

task.

My conclusions are divided into the three proposals that
together,

I feel, would be very effective in controlling

corporate criminality.

One is applying the traditional criminal

law to encompass harmful corporate behavior.

The second is to

institute mandatory ethics courses from high school on through

college.

The final aspect is utilizing publicity to its fullest

extent as a sanction against those who engage in corporate
criminal

acts.

When I promote the application of certain criminal laws to

corporate behavior,

I do so for a specific reason.

The reason

is that the current laws with which to charge a corporation

exist but are not being utilized for that purpose.

In order to

use the present laws to deal with corporate behavior, specific
stipulations would be necessary with their application.

First

and foremost, the criminal laws will have to be applied
discriminatively.

Not every law will apply to a corporation.

A

prime example of applying a criminal law to corporate behavior
is illustrated with the Indiana law that defined a corporation

as a person,

thereby allowing prosecution of the Ford Motor

Company on criminal charges of reckless homicide for their
defective Pintos (Cullen,
Second,

what is

Maakestad,

and Cavender,

1987).

necessary is a set of guidelines that are

somewhat universal in their definitions.

because without basic definitions,

This is important

each corporation could claim

that it does not apply to the particular rule(s),

and if this
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occurs,

it is difficult to proceed against it when a violation

occurs.

One term that would have to be defined is

because

it

Finally,

is

the

center

around

which

all

the

laws

"criminality"
focus.

I think it is quite important for a regular review and

revision to take place to account for the changes in the
political,

economic,

and legal environment.

The second part of my plan involves instituting a mandatory

ethics program from high school on.
crucial step for several reasons.

get jobs within corporations,

This to me is the most
Before people are adults and

they are young adults in school.

These young adults are still impressionable and could benefit a

great deal from a course of business ethics.

I feel that the

more

it

a

class

like

that

is

reinforced

the

more

will

become

second nature for the student and aspiring business person.
Another

reason

that

I

think

that

education

in

ethics

is

vital

is

because of the attitude that most of society has regarding
money.

We,

as educators,

need to start acknowledging the

business people who strive to make good products,
on their accounting logs,

who do not lie

or do not cause environmental harm

through expansion of their own self-interest.

I believe that an ethics program would take some initial
work and money to institute,

but the money that it could save in

the future would be considerable.

Once people get more exposure

to the kind of violations that actually take place within
corporations,

and when they see that good businesses do not have

to lie and steal,
moral

maybe we will start an upward spiral to better

standards.

The third stage of my plan is to use publicity to its
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fullest extent to deter corporate criminals from further
violation.

This would

be effective because of the increased

accountability that goes along with having your own face on the
television set or in the newspaper.

Most people do not want to

have the negative stigma associated with their names and
criminal acts.

An

indirect consequence of a corporate executive

having his face on the six o'clock news is that it reflects upon
the entire corporation.

This in turn can be a deterrent before

a violation even occurs,

but even more so after a violation is

committed.

With publicity as a sanction, the government can force the

corporation to pay for all of the publicity costs that are
incurred throughout the sentence.
Although no plan is completely foolproof in its attempt to

control corporate crime,

by reforming certain aspects of the

criminal justice system,

I believe a foundation upon which to

build future proposals is created.
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